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LEGISLATION
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN NEW YORK STATE
The New York State judicial system is an enormous operation, settling,
administering and reviewing at present well over one million cases annually.
Its magnitude and importance to both litigants and taxpayers is readily apparent
when it is realized that the cost of maintaining the courts in New York City
alone is greater than that of the entire federal system.1 In view of these facts,
every New York citizen has the right to expect that his state's judicial system
is managed in the most economical and efficient manner possible. However, the
present business administration of our courts falls far short of these standards,
and our court system is characterized by an almost complete lack of unity and
coordination as far as fiscal, personnel or budgetary matters are concerned. These
factors have not only caused the taxpayer to assume a greater tax burden, but
the existent court congestion and calendar delay, often resulting in hardships
to litigants, can in large measure be attributed directly to them.
It was this combination of increasingly uneconomical judicial administration
and court delay that has brought the need for judicial reform to the forefront,
causing it to become of paramount concern today. The New York legislature,
realizing the severity of the existing problems within our court structure, has
recently created the Judicial Conference of the State of New York,2 and given
this organization the primary responsibility for surveying and studying all
matters affecting the administration of justice.3 The purpose of this article is to
note the main problems which exist in the administration of our judicial system
and to see the progress made by the Judicial Conference in its attempt to
alleviate these problems.
The underlying cause of the problem of inefficient judicial administration is
to be found in the historical development of our courts.1 This state's court
system has been organized and evolved along completely independent lines, so
that each court is not only separate from the other branches of state government, which is an obvious prerequisite to the proper dispensation of justice,
but is also generally free of any administrative ties with other courts within
the judicial system. While there are some twenty-one separate and distinct
courts serving the people of this state, there is a complete absence of any
centralized administrative organization charged with overseeing this vast operation. These courts have developed not only under state law, but county, city,
town and village as well, usually being financed by the local governmental
division in which they preside. This feature of court development has, to a
1. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Bad Housekeeping 43 (19S4).
2. N.Y. Judiciary Law §§ 230-39.
3. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 233.

4. "Our court system does not represent the evolution of any plan for a single unified
state-wide court. Quite the contrary-it is the result of accidental historical growth, of successive additions and alterations in response to immediate and compelling demands caused by
a continuing increase in the volume of judicial business." Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Bad Housekeeping 23 (1954).
5. Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 7 (Feb. 17, 1955).
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large extent, been the major reason that each court is practically administratively autonomous within its jurisdiction, deciding its own budgetary and
personnel requirements. The natural result of this lack of administrative integration has been the presence of uneconomical and inefficient practices, which
failings have fallen upon the New York citizens in the form of higher taxes and
court delays.
There can be little doubt that a reorganized and centralized method of
administering our court system would in large part minimize these difficulties
and provide the basis for a modernized and coordinated system of budgeting,
financing and personnel management. Such.a result is impossible at the present
time, where each court is concerned only with immediate pressures and problems, with no duty to concern itself with the effective administration of the
over-all judicial system. Specifically, this present administrative independence
of our courts results in the following unfavorable qualities: an inadequate
system of transferring judges to court-congested areas; 0 a lack of suitable
standards for compensation of non-judicial personnel; 7 a lack of uniformity in
appropriation requests made by each court; 8 the unnecessary expenditure of
judicial time on non-judicial matters; 9 and the failure to exchange information
10
regarding improved administrative practices instituted by the separate courts.
6. The transfer of judges from courts where the work is up to date to congested courts
has long been in practice in New York, though it involves a complicated procedure. Each
appellate division may, of course, make assignments of the supreme court judges within its
own department. But it was only in 1954 that inter-court assignments of judges in New
York City was authorized. N.Y. Const. art. VI, §§ 14-a, 15-a. At present, the transfer of
judges from one judicial district to another requires a great expenditure of time and effort.
A request by the presiding justice of one department must be made to the trial judge in
another district, and his consent obtained. This consent needs approval both by the presiding
justice of the department in which the trial judge sits and of the Governor before the transfer
can be made.
7. A study was made of the judicial administration in New York with respect to clerical
and management positions of non-judicial personnel and their respective salaries, as they related to the provisions of the Judiciary Law which enumerates certain positions and salaries
for such personnel. As there was found to be great disparities between the outmoded provisions of the Judiciary Law and the practices in the various courts, it was concluded that
".... in the non-judicial positions of the Judiciary there is need for a standardization of
position titles, for an establishment of classes of work . . . and for a compensation plan
which will assure both the principles of equal pay for equal work and an orderly progression
of salary increments. The present situation is confusing." Report of the Temporary State
Commission on Coordination of State Activities 42 (Mar. 12, 1953).
8. A thorough examination of the methods of preparing budgetary estimates was made
by a Special Committee on the Administration of Justice and it was found that our judicial
budget estimates were unsatisfactory because no single agency was aware of the over-all
needs of the judiciary, the present practice being for each court to prepare its own budget
with consideration given only to its own needs without regard to the needs of the entire
judiciary. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Bad Housekeeping 113-21 (1954).
'9. It is obvious that justice will suffer if our courts devote too much of their time to
administrative details. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Court Reform and
the Citizen-1956, 5 (1956).
10. Our judicial system lacks a central administrative organization whose duty 'it Is to

1957]

LEGISLATION

These matters could in large measure be corrected by a centralized organization for the administration of the courts. Such a revised system would better
insure that all funds appropriated for the administration of justice would be
disposed of in an efficient and business-like manner. In addition, it would allow
the public, for the first time, to become aware of the costs of judicial services
and also which agencies were spending these funds. Of primary importance
though, would be the fact that under this centralized system the funds would
be allocated according to an over-all fiscal plan and policy, having regard to
the needs of the judiciary of the entire state. This agency would have a full
perspective of the state-wide judicial system and could systematically study,
plan and administer for the benefit of the entire judiciary. This organization,
of course, must necessarily remain under the guidance and direction of the
courts in order to safeguard the independence of the judicial function."'
As previously noted, a beginning has been made in this direction through
the creation of the New York State Judicial Conference which has assumed, to
The foundaa small degree, the business administration of the state courts,
tion for this organization was developed early in 1953 when the Temporary
State Commission on Co-ordination of State Activities suggested that consideration be given to the establishment of a state-wide agency which would devote
itself to improving the administration of our judicial system. 13
In addition, a thorough study of this problem of judicial administration was
made in 1954 by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York under a
special committee organized for this purpose.-" This committee recommended
that to meet the numerous basic defects in the management of court personnel
and business, a system of court administration should be instituted which would
provide for an intelligent, centralized control of court business under the direction of the judges. Furthermore, that administrative operations should center
3
in an executive under the general supervision of the judges.'
As an additional motivation to the solution of centralized business adminisobtain information as to business and calendar proceedings, costs, revenue and financing
and similar matters, Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 7 (Feb. 17, 1955).

11. While it is advantageous to have a central administrative organization v.hich would
handle the business problem arising in our court system, it would be axtrcmcly unwise to
allow this organization to be distinct from the judiciary. The situation could then conceivably arise where this organization, through budgetary and personnel practices, could
seriously impair the functioning of our judiciary and further infringe upon the fundamental

doctrine of separation of powers.
12. The Conference has the power to require all judicial and non-judicial personnel to
comply with its request for relevant information and statistical data. N.Y. Judiciary Law
§ 233(2). However, it lacks the power to require these courts to correct any administrative
practices, and is limited to making recommendations concerning thesL matters. N.Y.
Judiciary Law § 233.
13. N.Y. Leg. Doc. Vol. VII, No. 54 (1953).

This was a special report made by this

Commission on the subject of clerical and administrative positions and calaries of nonjudicial personnel.
14. This constituted a report of the Special Committee on Studies and Sutveys of the
Administration of Justice, Bad Housekeeping (1954).
15. Id. at 150-59.
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tration, the Temporary Commission on the Courts, during their comprehensive
study of the court system, recommended in 1954 that an organization called it
Judicial Conference be created for the administration of the courts, to which
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, as well itsthe
people themselves, could turn for information, advice and assistance, and to
which they could make suggestions on matters pertaining to the business of the
courts.'0
However, the legislature did not act on this recommendation immediately,
first giving some consideration to two opposing arguments. These arguments
took the approach that there was no real need for the Conference or an administrator, and, secondly, that their creation would encroach upon the necessary
independence of the judiciary. The former argument was obviously untenable
in light of the existing administrative problem in our courts. The latter argument was also shown to be ill-founded, when it was demonstrated that the
judiciary itself was in favor of establishment of the Conference. Furthermore,
its formation would in no way impair the dignity of the court, or affect its
freedom of action in judicial matters, since the courts in fact would control the
actions of the administrative officer. Reference to the success these conferences
was an additional rebuttal to those opposing
had achieved in other jurisdictions
17
the institutions proposed.
For example, on the federal level, a judicial conference exists and successfully
functions. Originally, it was composed solely of judges, 18 but the federal judiciary, realizing the importance and need for efficient business administration in
its courts, sponsored legislation which created the position of administrative
officer of the federal courts.19 The solid accomplishments of this office in
of the federal judicial system is well
securing the effective administration
20
attested to by many authorities.
Disposing of these aforementioned arguments, the Temporary Commission
made continued studies, surveys and conferences and renewed their efforts2'1
before the 1955 legislative session for the passage of its proposed bill " for the
establishment of a Judicial Conference. This bill charged the Conference with
the responsibility for a continuing survey and study of all matters affecting the
business administration of the courts. The subjects to be studied, and on which
recommendations rather than direct orders would be based, included organiza16. Preliminary Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts (March 5, 1954).
17. For an extensive discussion of the progress made through' the formation of a centralized organization for judicial administration in the various states see Institute of Judidal
Administration, Court Administration (1955).
18. Chandler, The Administration of the Federal Courts, 13 Law and Contemp. Probs.

182 (1948).
19.

28 U.S.C.A. 601 (1948).

20. Medina, The Work of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 11
F.R.D. 353 (1951) ; Vinson, The Business of Judicial Administration, 9 F.R.D. 185 (1949) ;
Chandler, The Administration of the Federal Courts, 13 Law and Contemp. Probs, 182
(1948).

21.
22.

Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts (Feb. 17, 1955).
Id. at 68.
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tion, jurisdiction, procedures, and statistics concerning the courts and their
clerical, fiscal, and personnel practices. The bill was eventually passed by the
legislature and became a law effective April 1, 1955.23
This legislation's primary objective was to effect an improvement in the
judicial system by establishing a state-wide agency called the Judicial Conference of New York State. The organizational makeup of the Conference is
twofold. It has, at its head, a policy-making group of nine judges, who actually
control the operations of this organization.24 In addition, there is in each of
under the
the four judicial departments a committee for court administration
25
direction of the presiding judge of each appellate division.
The Conference is empowered to appoint a state-wide administrator and a
deputy administrator in each department. The administrator attends to the
innumerable details of running a state-wide business with divisions in every
county of the state. All the administrators, with appropriate staff assistance,
carry out the functions and duties as directed by the Conference. These duties
generally consist of studying the varying methods and procedures under which
the individual courts operate, and making recommendations thereafter for
improving these practices, if deemed desirable. These recommendations usually
encompass four major areas, namely: (1) collection and compilation of all
judicial statistics; (2) organization and jurisdiction of our courts; (3) practices
and procedures in our courts; and (4) the administration of justice generally.2
One of the effects of the establishment of the Conference was that it actually
supplanted the Judicial Council, assuming all the former powers of that organization 2 7 The Council had been created in 1934,2s to make recommendations
for the purpose of providing for the most efficient judicial system which it was
possible to formulate and execute.9 It was never fully successful as it was not
considered to be an administrative subdivision of the court system which
required either recognition or compliance with its pronouncements. Furthermore, the statistics it gathered, when finally published, often proved to be too
late to be of legislative value.30
Though only recently formed, the Conference has nevertheless accomplished
some fine results. It has compiled essential and detailed statistics on work in
the courts 3 ' which will serve as one basis for any future legislation to correct
uneconomical practices and to rectify the over-all problem of court delay.3 2
23. See note 2 supra.

24. N.Y. judiciary Law § 230.
25. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 235.

26. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 233. See also, Second Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York (1957).
27. First Annual Report of The judicial Conference of the State of New York 13 (1956).
28. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1934, c. 128.
29. First Report of the Judicial Council of the State of New York 13 (1935).
30. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Bad Housekeeping 13 (1954).
31. Second Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York (1957).
32. The judicial Conference recently announced that substantial progress had been made
in reducing court delay. Delay was reduced from four to eight months in the Supreme Court
in New York, Bronx, Kings and Queens Counties. N.Y. Law Journal, Feb. 25, 1957, p. 1,

col 5.
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Needless to say, court reform cannot be attempted until our legislature Is well
aware of the specific areas in which the problems lie.88 Furthermore, the Conference is presently engaged in preliminary studies of the fiscal and personnel
policies of the state courts and is conducting surveys of certain matters of
organization and procedure.34 To date it has been instrumental in aiding the
passage of numerous laws to improve the operations of our judicial system.88
A significant action taken by the Conference was its recommendation that
summer sessions be held to alleviate court congestion. This recommendation
was acted upon last summer in the first and second departments,30 with the
result that many additional cases were disposed of.81 Though a final determination of the value of this session has not yet been formulated, its apparent effect
was certainly salutary.
During 1956, four additional studies were made by the Conference on the
following subjects: recommendations relating to the transfer of cases without
consent of parties from the New York Supreme Court to the lower courts; 88
consolidation of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims with that of the Supreme
Court;2 9 recommendations relating to lis pendens; 40 and recommendations relating to a Uniform City Court Act. 41 These studies are comprehensive, the
recommendations well founded, and it is to be expected that the legislature will
consider action on these reports in the present session.
Our New York State court system is now burdened with extensive administrative problems, problems which have developed by virtue of the fact that our
courts are vested by statutory and constitutional provisions and long traditions
with the right to run themselves administratively. The Judicial Conference is
presently attempting to untangle the courts from these difficulties. However,
it is limited in this endeavor by reason of the fact that it can do no more than
make recommendations, with each court for the most part free to run itself,
rejecting or accepting these recommendations at its own whim. This limitation
to date has prevented any centralized administrative plan for our court system,
but this soon may be eliminated by the passage of the proposed Uniform Court
Act, which has placed the administrative management of our entire court
system under the control of the Conference. 42 This proposed act, from an
33. The importance of collecting accurate and timely statistics by which to formulate

judicial policy is well attested to by one authority who stated, ".. , I am so impressed with
their importance that I do not hesitate to say that I do not see how a judicial system can
function effectively without them.. . ." Medina, The Work of the Administration Office of
the United States Courts, 11 F.R.D. 353, 360 (1951).
34. Second Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York (1957).
35. Id. at 17-24.
36. Calendar congestion was not acute in the other departments.
37. Second Annual Report of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York (1957).
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id. at 94.
40. Id. at 107.
41. Id. at 154.
42. Report of the Temporary Commission on the Courts 52-53. (Dec. 21, 1956).

1957]

LEGISLATION

administrative viewpoint alone, would vastly change and improve judicial
administration in this state.
The Conference has performed very creditably, accomplishing fine results
and taking effective steps toward alleviating some of the problems which exist
in the administrative functioning of our courts. Therefore, it is to be anticipated
that the work of the Conference will be eventually broadened, with the final
result culminating in an efficient, economical and centralized administration of
justice in this state.
THE PROTECTION OF A WIFE'S RIGHT TO SUPPORT IN NEW YORK
The migratory ex parte divorce, which began its ascendancy about fifty years
ago, has been a matter of concern from the outset to the absent spouse's state
of domicile. These states, while advocates for the welfare of the absent spouse,
are still bound to render full faith and credit to the foreign decree, thereby
limiting the protection they can give their own residents from the economic
effects of divorces.1 New York in an effort to protect a wife, whose husband
has obtained a valid ex parte divorce, enacted section 1170-b of the Civil Practice Act in 1953.2 This statute enabled the wife to obtain alimony or separate
maintenance notwithstanding the existence of a valid ex parte divorce. Though
there has been no decision by the United States Supreme Court as to the
constitutionality of this statute, the question will soon be before the Court in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.3 The New York Court of Appeals held in this case
that the husband's ex parte divorce was a valid dissolution of the marital status
and must be recognized by New York under the full faith and credit clause.
However, the court held that the ex parte divorce did not terminate the wife's
right to support as distinguished from the dissolution of the marital status.
Therefore the granting of alimony was not a violation of the full faith and
credit clause.
The basis for a court's jurisdiction in an action for divorce is the domicile of
the parties,4 the marital status of the parties in the state of domicile constituting
the res which the court's judgment may alter or dissolve. In Williams v. North
Carolina (1)r the Court held that an ex parte divorce decree is entitled to
recognition under the full faith and credit clause," as terminating the marriage,
provided the plaintiff was a domiciliary of the state granting the divorce. However, several years later in Esenwein v. Pennsylvania,7 doubts were expressed
1. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 US. 562 (1906); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Atherton v. Atherton, 131 US. 155 (1901).
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1170-b. If the wife brings an action for annulment, separation
or divorce and relief is denied because the husband has obtained an annulment, separation, or
divorce in an action rendered without in personam jurisiction over the wife, the court may
render such judgment as justice requires for maintenance of the wife.
3. 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, cert. granted, 352 US. 820 (1956).
4. Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law § 100 (1939).
5. Williams v. North Carolina (1), 317 US. 287 (1942).
6. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
7. "But I am not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service the
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in a dictum whether a valid ex parte divorce could change every legal relationship or obligation springing from the marriage. This latter view of the ex parte
divorce was both a recognition of the necessity for accommodation between the
conflicting interests of the two forums and an attempt to confine each state's
authority to the matter of its own primary concern. 8
Whether a valid ex parte divorce would terminate all the legal obligations of
the marriage was further clarified in Estin v. Estin9 which held that an ex parte
divorce would not terminate a decree for maintenance previously obtained by
the wife. The Court recognized that New York, the domicile of the wife, had
granted the wife a judgment, which is a property right, and that the Nevada
court, lacking personal jurisdiction over her could not render an in personam
judgment. "The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible-to
give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make
it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It accommodates the interests of both
Nevada and New York in this broken marriage by restricting each State to the
matter of her dominant concern."' 0 The Estin case expressed a concept, previously only hinted at," of the marital status as a bundle of rights rather than
as a single unit.12 This divisible divorce theory portended complications.
On its facts, the Estin case was limited to a determination of the rights of a
wife who was fortunate enough to have obtained a prior judgment, and made
no determination of her right to obtain alimony after a valid ex parte divorce.
An ex parte divorce cannot disturb any in personam rights13 of an absent spouse
as such action would violate due process of law.14 However, at this time, there
is uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court would consider that the wife
had an in personam right to alimony when this right was not reduced to a
judgment prior to the divorce decree. Some authorities claim there is no basis
for restricting the holding of the Estin case to situations where the wife has
already obtained a judgment, because the economic problem of the wife is the
same before5 or after such a judgment and should receive the same judicial
treatment.'
The New York Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant maintenance
decree need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support of the
other spouse or the children." Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1945) (concurring opinion).
8. "The problem under the full faith and credit clause is to accommodate as fully as possible the conflicting interests of the two States." Id. at 282.
9. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
10. Id. at 549.
11. Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279 (1945) (concurring opinions).
12. Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951).
13. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The Court determined that a mother's right
to the custody of children is a personal right and cannot be adjudicated by a court without
in personam jurisdiction.
14. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
15. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, cert. granted, 352 U.S. 820
(1956); Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951).
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except in the matrimonial actions specified in the Civil Practice AcL Therefore, once a husband had obtained a valid ex parte divorce, the wife, being
unable to institute a matrimonial action, was unable to obtain maintenance.
The legislature, to remove this procedural difficulty that prevented the courts
from granting a wife relief from the monetary hardships resulting from a valid
ex parte divorce, enacted 1170-b of the Civil Practice Act, which gave the New
York Supreme Court jurisdiction to grant alimony after a valid ex parte divorce.17
New York relied on the broad language and the underlying rationale of Estin
v. Estiiz that such a statute would not violate the full faith and credit clause,
in that the right to alimony or support of the New York domiciliary would in
any situation be considered a personal right.18 The New York courts have
upheld the constitutionality of the statute in Vandcrbilt v.Vandcrbill'O where
the wife obtained alimony after a valid ex parte divorce. The New York Court
of Appeals held there that the decree, while affecting a dissolution of the
marriage status, had no effect on the property rights of the parties.
A federal court, in Hopson v. Hopson,20 in a dictum, asserted that the right
to alimony flowed from the same substantive right whether it was reduced to a
judgment before the decree or not. The court reasoned that "it is certain, then,
that there are personal rights of a wife acquired through marriage which may
survive an ex parte foreign decree." 2' In this court's opinion alimony was such
a right. This dictum was followed by another decision of the same court in
Meredith v. Meredtl,2-2 which also held that the right of the wife to obtain a
judgment for alimony survives an ex parte divorce. The court distinguished
between a right to consortium, which may be dissolved by an ex parte divorce,
and those personal rights of a financial nature which may only be dissolved by
a court having personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
If the ex parte divorce is not deemed denied full faith and credit by subsequently allowing the wife to obtain alimony, the inducement to get a Nevada
or Florida decree will not be so strong, as the husband may well find after
remarriage that he has the legal obligation to support two wives. The recipient
of such a divorce will only have positive assurance, should the argument be
pursued to its logical conclusion, that his prior marriage is terminated and that
he has only gained the right to remarry.
The United States Supreme Court, as yet, has not had to decide the question
of whether a right to alimony, not reduced to a judgment, is a personal right
and consequently not affected by an ex parte judgment. A determination of
16. Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach, 96 N.Y. 456 (184); Ramsden v. Ramsden, 91 N.Y. 281

(1S83).
17. Law Revision Commission, 1953 Report, Act, Recommendation and Study relating to
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant maintenance to a vife notwithstanding a judgment of divorce, annulment or nullity of marriage of a court which did not have personal

jurisdiction over her.
18. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1943).
19. 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E2d 553, cert. granted, 352 U.. 820 (1956).
20.

221 Fad 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).

21.

Id. at 847.

22.

226 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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23
this point was not necessary in Armstrong v. Armstrong, where the husband,
a domiciliary of Florida, had obtained a divorce in an action where the wife had
not been personally served nor appeared in the action. Subsequently, the wife
brought an action in Ohio for a divorce and alimony. The Ohio court refused
to grant the divorce because the Florida decree had dissolved the marriage
status, but it did allow the wife alimony. The majority of the Supreme Court
interpreted the Florida decree as not adjudicating the absent spouse's right to
alimony. Under this view of the facts, Ohio could render alimony since the
Florida decree had not terminated the husband's duty to support the wife, and
had merely refrained from awarding alimony at that time. Therefore, the
Court did not reach the constitutional question of full faith and credit being
the same force and
denied the Florida judgment because the decree was given
24
granted.
where
state
the
in
entitled
was
it
which
to
effect
Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, interpreted the Florida decree as
expressly denying alimony. Nevertheless, he held ". . . Ohio was not compelled
1-25 He
to give full faith and credit to the Florida decree denying alimony ....
reasoned that alimony was a personal judgment and the wife could not be
subjected to a personal judgment without personal service or appearance. This
view would not restrict Estin v. Estin to cases where the wife had a prior
support decree, it being suggested that this is a meaningless distinction, the
nature of the right being the same in either case.
This reasoning, however, very clearly indicates that Section 1170-b of the
Civil Practice Act would not be considered as unconstitutional or against the
full faith and credit clause. There is no mention that the wife's state of
domicile has an interest in her economic welfare, the emphasis being put upon
the personal nature of the wife's right. The effect of an ex parte divorce would
be restricted to merely the right to remarry and would have no effect on the
husband's duty to support his wife when the wife's state of domicile allowed
alimony to survive an ex parte divorce. Such an interpretation of the effect
of ex parte divorces would accommodate the interests of the several states to
of their dominant concern. This result, while it is open to objecthe matters
tion, 26 would be the most realistic approach to our "crazy quilt of divorce
27

laws.")

Clearly, Armstrong v. Armstrong, is not determinative of the constitutionality
of section 1170-b. However, the concurring opinion of Justice Black will be a
persuasive argument for its constitutionality when the Supreme Court decides
the issue. Until the Court specifically holds that decrees granting alimony after
a valid ex parte divorce are not in violation of the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution, there can be no certainty as to the ultimate
validity of the New York ex parte support statute.
23. 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
24. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Roche v. McDonald, 275
U.S. 449 (1928); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317

(1905).
25.
26.
27.

See note 23 supra at 576.
Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951).
Rice v. Rice, 336 U.. 674, 680 (1949).
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THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Recently a complaint filed by the State Bar Association of Connecticut
against the Hartford National Bank and Trust Company sought to enjoin the
bank from the practice of law. It was alleged that the bank was, through its
legal department, drawing wills and performing other extra-banking services
for its depositors free of charge.'
This is only an example of an invasion of the legal profession by those
unauthorized to practice law. As early as 1914 Unitcd States Title & Guaranty
Co. v. Browu, stated: "The profession of law, one of the oldest known to civilization, involving the most sacred confidence between man and man, with its past
of high ideals and service to humanity, has in the last quarter of a century
suffered much from the inroads of the new financial and business methods in
this great land of ours."2 To meet this thrust all the states of the United States
have enacted legislation for the protection of the legal profession.3 In New
York the practice of law by persons who are not licensed attorneys is outlawed
by the Penal Code. 4 In addition, any unauthorized person or any corporation
or unincorporated association engaging in the practice of law is deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor.0
Occasionally the reported cases deal with unauthorized practice by individual
citizens who are not engaged in any other business,0 but more frequently they
involve the more difficult problem presented by those individuals and organizations engaged in pursuits closely related to certain fields of law, namely, collection bureaus, real estate agencies and firms, banks and trust companies, tax
adjusters, accountants and budget planning associations. When determining
whether or not individuals or organizations whose legitimate activities are
closely attuned to those of the practicing lawyer are overstepping their bounds
it must first be determined what activities are included in the term "practice of
law." While definitions are numerous and extensive treatments of the term can
be found in American Jurisprudence 7 and Corpus Juris Secundum,8 no test of
1. State Bar Ass'n v. Hartford Natl Bank and Trust Co., File No. 107313 (Superior
Court, Hartford Co., Nov. 21, 1956).
2. 86 Misc. 287, 290, 147 N.Y. Supp. 186, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aIfd, 166 App. Div. 68,
152 N.Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dep't 1915), aff'd, 217 N.Y. 623, 111 N.E. 828 (1916).
3. See Hicks and Katz, Unauthorized Practice of Law 15-61 (1934).
4. N.Y. Pen. Code §§ 270 and 271 forbid any individual but a licensed attorney to practice within the state. N.Y. Pen. Code § 280 forbids corporations and unincorporated associa-

tions to practice law in the State of New York. Soliciting, assistance in soliciting, or hiring
others for the purpose of soliciting legal business is prohibited by N.Y. Pen. Code §§ 270-a,
270-b, 270-c, and 270-d. See also N.Y. Pen. Code §§ 272-a, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, and 279
which govern the conduct of attorneys themselves.
5. N.Y. Pen. Code §§ 272 and 2S0. It has been held that despite statutes making the
unauthorized practice of law a crime, persons so practicing are also subject to civil injunction.
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 At. 139 (1935). In
New York see C.P.A. § 1221-b.
6. Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 294 N.Y. 8S3, 62 N.E2d 398 (1945);
Childs v. Smeltzer, 313 Pa. 9, 171 AUt. S83 (1934).
7. 5 Am. Jur., Attorney at Law § 3 (1936).
8. 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 3(g) (1937).
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exactly what does or does not constitute the practice of law has yet been laid
down. A frequently cited definition of the term appears in In re Duncan where
the court stated: ". . . the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in courts . . . .it embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other

papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and, in
general, all advice to clients, and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law." 9
However, as can be seen, the cases indicate that even language as inclusive
as that quoted above is subject to further qualification. For example, in People
v. Goldsmith'0 it was held that drawing a will in an isolated instance was not
the practice of law where defendant did not hold himself out as an attorney or
as being qualified to practice law. Nor is it the practice of law to draw a legal
instrument where only the clerical labor of filling out stereotyped forms which
demand no legal determination is involved." Furthermore when applying the
term practice of law to a corporation a further distinction must be kept in mind.
As was said in In re Otterness: "There can be no objection to the hiring of an
attorney on an annual salary basis by banks, other corporations, firms, or
individuals, to attend to and conduct its or their legal business. .

.

.But

neither a corporation nor a layman, not admitted to practice, can practice law,
attorney to practice law for others
nor indirectly practice law by hiring a licensed
12
for the benefit or profit of such hirer.'
Though some states have specific and precise statutory definitions of the
term "practice of law,"' 13 others seem not to have defined it in order to leave
the definition flexible.' 4 However, in the light of Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v.
Automobile Services Ass'n' 5 this caution seems to be unnecessary, for there
it was pointed out that the courts have always had the power to define "practice
of law" and the statutory definitions were not all encompassing.' 0 This being
so, it seems that the only way to attain a better understanding of when individuals and organizations whose activities are similar to those of the lawyer
are practicing law is to examine some of the leading cases on the subject within
the related fields.
Real Estate Agents and Firms
17
In Paul v. Stanley, defendant, a bonded real estate agent and broker, was
accustomed to drawing various legal documents concerned with real property
9. 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909).
10. 249 N.Y. 586, 164 N.E. 593 (1928), reversing, 224 App. Div. 707, 229 N.Y. Supp.
896 (1st Dep't 1928). See also People v. Weil, 237 App. Div. 118, 260 N.Y. Supp. 658
(1st Dep't 1932).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. 181 Minn. 254, 255, 232 N.W. 318, 319 (1930).
13. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon and Texas.
14. All states except those in note 13 supra.
15. 55 R.I. 122, 179 AUt. 139 (1935). In New York see Judiciary Law §§ 90(2), 750(7).
16. 55 R.I. at 127, 179 AtI. at 141.
17. 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
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in exchange for monetary compensation. The lower court ruled that defendant
was not guilty of practicing law without a license because he drew the instruments in conjunction with his legitimate real estate business. On appeal the
decision was reversed, the court stating that "... .the evidence dearly established the fact that respondent not only prepared legal documents, but also
gave legal advice."' 8 The giving of legal advice as to the validity of the documents and their legal effect seemed to be the determining factor. This view of
the case is strengthened by dictum in a later case in the same court where it
distinguished the Stanley case pointing out that there legal advice had been
given. 9
In the New York case of People v. Alfani "° the defendant, who was not a
licensed attorney, carried on a real estate and insurance business in his home.
It appeared that the defendant had, as a part of such business, drawn contracts
for real estate, deeds, mortgages, bills of sale, and wills. While the court in
holding defendant guilty of practicing law without a license did not say that
giving legal advice was the deciding factor of the case, it appeared that, in one
instance at least, defendant upon being asked whether he would supply legal
advice in case of need, answered in the affirmative.
Collection Agents and Agencies
Collection agents are another group who have been guilty of incursions into
the legal profession. The New York case of L. Mcisel & Co. v. National
Jewelers Bd. of Trade2 ' was concerned with a corporation which undertook to
aid creditors in the collection of debts from insolvent debtors. The corporation
represented creditors in bankruptcy proceedings and in general assignments.
The court in holding that defendant was engaged in the practice of law said of
defendant's actions: "These services require special knowledge, the fidelity of
the relation between attorney and client, responsibility to the courts and, for
success, experience in what is generally recognized as a special line of legal
work."2 2 The court further held that the New York statutep applied despite
the fact that the
actions were brought in the bankruptcy court, a court of the
United States.2 4
Another New York case involving a corporation organized for the purpose
of making collections was Matter of Wellington.2 5 There the corporation was
18. Id. at 376, 12 P2d at 404. (Emphasis added.)
19. In re McCallum, 1S6 Wash. 312, 57 P.2d 1259 (1936).
20. 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
21. 90 Mfsc. 19, 152 N.Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd without opinion, 173 App.
Div. 389, 157 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (1st Dep't 1916).
22. 90 Misc. at 25, 152 N.Y. Supp. at 913.
23. N.Y. Pen. Code § 280.
24. 90 Misc. 19, 29, 152 N.Y. Supp. 913, 919-20 (Sup. Ct. 1915). The court stated: "The
statute not only prohibits a corporation from appearing as attorney in any court in this state,
or before any juridical body, but prohibits it from rendering or furnishing legal service of any

kind in actions or proceedings of any nature, and from, in any other manner, a=zuming to be
entitled to practice law.
25. 154 Misc. 271, 276 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Surr. Ct. 1935), modification denied, 160 MILc.
383, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (Surr. CL 1936).
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organized to solicit and obtain powers of attorney from foreigners who were
prospective beneficiaries of decedents. Upon obtaining such power the corporation by itself and through attorneys employed by it participated in the administration of the estate and collection of legacies. It was held that the corporation
was engaged in the practice of law both by engaging in the business for which
it was formed and by employing attorneys to act for it.
The last mentioned case is to be distinguished from one such as Buxton v.
Lietz.26 There plaintiff, a collection agent, brought an action on a contract
under which plaintiff had agreed to collect defendant's debts for a fee. The
contract provided that if preliminary methods proved unavailing the plaintiff
would, for a percentage of the collected money, bring suit against the debtor.
Plaintiff brought suit through licensed attorneys. The New York City
Municipal Court held that the plaintiff was engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law and could not collect on the contract. The difference between this case
and the Wellington case seems to be that in the latter the very purpose for
which the corporation was organized was illegal, while in the former, though
plaintiff was in a legitimate business, he overextended himself by using lawyers
and other legal means to aid him in his collections. This point is well treated in
State v. C. S. Dudley & Co.,27 a Missouri case. There the court pointed out that
the defendant had a right to collect debts from others provided it did not
employ an attorney or promise to employ one or threaten the debtor with suit.
The court recommended that if collection could not be made without the aid of
ligitation or threats of legal action the claim should be returned to the creditor
who should select and employ his own attorney.
Budget Planning
One of the more recent methods used by the layman to infringe upon the
domain of the attorney is so-called budget planning or debt adjusting. The
alleged purpose of budget planning companies was to act as intermediaries
between wage earners who had become enmeshed in debt and their creditors.
The budget planners claimed that if the debtors would pay them a fixed sum
of money regularly and periodically they would, for a fee, deal with the creditors
and in this way protect the debtor from suits and garnishments. In many cases
budget planners charged exorbitant fees and either rendered no services or only
the bare minimum of service to the debtor. In New York, among other states, this
abusive practice led to drastic action on the part of the legislature. In 1956 a
new article was added to the Penal Code28 which outlawed budget planning
for all but attorneys-at-law. Anomalously, the legislature refused to pass a bill20
similar to a Massachusetts act,3" constituting budget planning as the practice
of law. However, as the statute now reads, any individual, unlicensed as an
attorney, or any corporation or association engaged in budget planning or debt
26.

136 N.Y. Supp. 829 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1912).

27.

340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895 (1937).

28. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 410-12.
29. S. Int. 54, 179th N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1956).
30. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 221, § 46c (1955).
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adjusting in New York State is, for all practical purposes, deemed to be engaging
in the unathorized practice of law.
Banks and Trust Companies
Banks and trust companies have often been found guilty of practices which are
a serious threat to the legal profession. Illustrative is the case of In re Otterness.31 There defendant, a lawyer, was employed by a Minnesota bank as
vice president at a fixed salary. By agreement the defendant was to continue
in the practice of law for the bank and others and all fees earned by him were
to go to the bank as part of its income. Large sums of money were earned by the
defendant for the bank as a result of this practice. It was held that the bank was
illegally carrying on the practice of law.
It is not necessary in order to violate the law that one actually practice law.
It is enough to hold oneself out as competent to do so. In the case of it re
Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co.,32 the bank advertised itself as being "... a
specialist in the matter of drawing trust agreements, Declarations of Trust and
Wills ... ".3 The Idaho State Board of Bar Commissioners instituted a proceeding to secure an order requiring the bank and its president to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt of court for holding themselves
out as qualified to practice law. Defendants' demurrer was overruled, the
court holding that from the facts admitted by the demurrer it appeared that the
defendants were illegally holding themselves out to the public as competent in
certain branches of the law.
On the other hand there are cases holding in favor of the banks and trust
companies. If the maker of an instrument applies to a bank without solicitation
it may aid him in framing the instrument. 34 Furthermore a trust company has
the right to advertise that it is qualified as a fiduciary and to give advice with
respect to questions of business judgment provided that the advertisements do
not infer that it can practice law.35
The leading case in New York on the practice of law by banks is People v.
Peoples Trust Co.36 in which it was held that a bank which advertised that it
would, through its legal department, furnish free advice in regard to the making
of wills was engaged in the practice of law.
Title Companies
In several states the rights of title companies in relation to the practice of law
are defined by statute.3 7 In one of the latest cases on the subject, a title company
contracted with the Ohio Turnpike Commission to furnish, for monetary compensation, statements of all the title defects and encumbrances against the right
31.

See note 12 supra.

32.

49 Idaho 2S0, 2SS Pac. 157 (1930).

33. Id. at 280, 283 Pac. at 15S.
34. In re Umble's Estate, 117 Pa. Super. 15, 177 At. 340 (1935).
35. Ibid. See also Cain v. lerchant's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 263 N.W. 719

(1936).
36. 18o App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't 1917).
37. In New York see the N.Y. Pen. Code § 230(5).
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of way parcels, together with curative recommendations. It was held that this
was the illegal practice of law, the Ohio court noting that it was significant
that under the contract the services would have to be rendered whether or not
title insurance was issued by the company. 38 A similar holding can be found in
an earlier case in the same state, Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken.8 0
There it was held that although title companies were authorized by statute to
prepare and furnish certificates stating that a search had been made and that
certain entries and claims had been found in the record, they were not thereby
permitted to give opinions as to the conditions or validity of titles not guaranteed by them.
In State v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n,40 the court had before it the question
of whether or not defendant's opinion on the title to real property was the
illegal practice of law. The defendant, in reports to individual members, would
certify that ". . . within the scope of our investigation, except for the encumbrances shown above, property appears clear, free, and unencumbered." The
court stated that this opinion was not a positive statement of the nature of title
such as the opinion of a competent attorney would be, but was merely a certificate that except as noted there is no lien of record against the particular property. The defendant here was not a title company. However, the court's reasoning would seem to be applicable to a title company in the same situation.
In New York a specific statutory provision permits title companies to draw
legal papers affecting real property so long as these papers are necessary for and
incidental to the examination and insuring of titles to real property and to the
making of loans.4 1 The leading New York case on the unauthorized practice of
law by title companies is People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.42 There, at the
request of two detectives employed by the Brooklyn Bar Association, employees
of the defendant corporation prepared a bill of sale of personal property and
a chattel mortgage thereon for six dollars. The lower court held that the preparation of such documents was not incidental to the insuring of real property
and that defendant was guilty of practicing law without a license. The Court of
Appeals reversed, three judges dissenting. In an opinion by Chief Judge Hiscock
the court stated that the governing statutes were not meant to apply to filling
out the blanks of simple forms where no legal advice is given. Judge Pound
concurred in the result but said that he did not see any difference between
simple and complex forms, and felt that the very fact that one makes application to another for aid in filling out a form is indicative that, as far as the one
requesting is concerned, a form is not simple. Moreover, he reasoned, approval
by the corporation of the blank forms constituted tacit advice to the client that
such forms are proper. Judge Pound stated that the customary rendering of such
services by the corporation would amount to the unauthorized practice of law,
38. Steer v. Land Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio 1953).
39. 129 Ohio 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934).
40. 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918 (1931).
41. See note 37 supra.
42. 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919), reversing, 180 App. Div. 648, 168 N.Y. Supp. 278
(2d Dep't 1917).
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and only the fact that this was an isolated instance led him to concur in the
case's result.

Conclusion
It appears that no corporation or unlicensed individual can in any case: represent another in a court of record; 43 hire lawyers to render legal services to
another;" promise another to employ an attorney for him for a consideration; 43
or threaten to bring suit for another with whom he has no common interest.40

Moreover, except in the case of title companies exercising the powers given them
by statute, no person or corporation may give legal advice to others.7 Nor may
any unlicensed person or corporation hold himself or itself out as an attorney or
as qualified to give legal advice.48 A bank may, however, hold itself out as a fiduciary and as qualified to give advice on matters of business judgment.49
However, a more difficult problem arises where the drawing of legal instruments is involved. Title companies and real estate agents may do so as an
incident of their legitimate business. As to instances of others drawing them,
there is much emphasis in the cases and texts on the difference between simple
and complex instruments. It is suggested that Judge Pound was correct in
stating in the Title Guaranty Co. 0 case that the distinction is an artificial one
and that the true rule is that anyone can draw any instrument for himself or for
another provided that he does not give advice as to the legal effect of the instrument or infer that his opinion is as competent as that of an attorney. Of course
one who is in the business of drawing such instruments when he does not do so
necessarily in conjunction with a legitimate business is practicing law; for by so
doing he is implying that he is in all ways competent to draw such instruments.
The above statements are, of course, like every other attempt to define what constitutes the practice of law, mere guideposts and each case can only be decided
upon its particular circumstances.
It is fair to say that the courts and the legislatures are making an honest
attempt to protect licensed attorneys and to preserve the public from the evils
to which it would be subject following the decline or destruction of the legal
profession, while at the same time respecting the rights of honest and legitimate
businessmen. However, the efforts of the courts and legislatures will be
unavailing without the sustained help of the members of the legal profession
themselves.
The unauthorized practice of law by large corporations is a direct case in point.
Corporations entering into the field of law usually do so with the aid of licensed
43. See p. 165 and note 21 supra. See also N.Y. Pen. Code §§ 270, 250.
44. See pp. 164, 165 and notes 12, 25 supra.
45. See p. 166 and note 27 supra.
46. See p. 166 and note 27 supra. The words "no common interest" are meant to except
administrators, guardians ad litem, etc.
47. See pp. 164, 165 and notes 17, 18, 19, 20 supra. N.Y. Pen. Code § 2MO(S) defines the
right of title companies in this regard in New York State.
48. See p. 167 and note 32 supra.
49. See p. 167 and note 35 supra.
50. See p. 168 and note 42 supra.
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attorneys. 51 In order to insure the needed cooperation of all the members of the
bar it is suggested that all attorneys who aid others in the unauthorized practice
of law be subject to sanctions. Since it would be harsh to punish those acting
in good faith it would seem that a necessary prerequisite to such sanctions would
be the instruction of all practicing attorneys as to what their jurisdiction generally
accepts as constituting the unauthorized practice of law. The proper media
for such instruction would appear to be the law schools or bar associations.
However, the question of effective sanctions presents difficulties. Several years
ago the New York State Legislature after declaring certain acts of misconduct of
an attorney to be a misdemeanor, added ". . . and on conviction thereof, shall be
punished accordingly and must be removed from office by the Supreme Court."52
This portion of the statute was later deleted, the legislature reasoning that it was
an infringement on the inherent power of the judiciary.63 The right to discipline
court officers belongs to the judiciary, it is true, but may not the legislature specifically include among those acts of misconduct of an attorney which constitute
misdemeanors the aiding of others in the illegal practice of law? Nor need the
judiciary's inherent control over the qualifications of its officers prevent vigilance
on the part of the bar associations, as auxiliaries of the court, from seeking out
and recommending for suspension or disbarment attorneys aiding unauthorized
persons to practice law.
COMPULSORY LIABILITY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
IN NEW YORK
Chapter 655 of the New York Sessions Laws of 1956 amends the Vehicle and
Traffic Law by adding Article 6-A (Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act)'
which provides for compulsory automobile liability insurance. By this chapter,
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, old Article 6-A, is retained and
renumbered 6-B. 2 With this amendment the New York Legislature has
attempted to provide some source of compensation for the innocent victims of
traffic accidents caused by the negligence of the uninsured motorist.
The problem of the financially irresponsible motorist has long been an
increasingly vexing one on a national scale. Legislation, enacted to meet the
problem, can be placed in five distinct categories: (1) security-type safety
responsibility laws,3 (2) financial responsibility laws,4 (3) automobile com51. See pp. 164-67 and notes 12, 25, 27, 36 supra.
52. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, c. 676.
53. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 822, § 10. See also Law Revision Comm'n Report,
Recommendations and Studies, 1939, 828, 832.
1. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 93 to 93-k.
2. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 94 to 94-nn.
3. Such laws have been enacted in forty-eight jurisdictions of the United States, including
New York. In general, they require the owner to post security, whether or not he is at
fault, to cover damages, and to provide proof of financial security in the future, within a
stated period of time after an accident, or suffer suspension of his license and registration.
Such an act remains in effect in New York as Art. 6-B of the Vehicle & Traffic Law.
4. These laws are now obsolete except in two jurisdictions, viz., Kansas and South
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pensation plans (commonly known as the Saskatchewan Plan),U (4) unsatisfied judgment funds,6 and (5) compulsory automobile liability insurance.7
In 1929, New York took its initial steps to protect victims of vehicular accidents caused by the uninsured motorist by the enactment of the Financial
Responsibility Act. In 1941 that act was repealed but the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act was substituted which, by the pre-ent amendment,
has become Article 6-B of the Vehicle & Traffic Law. Mhile both acts required
proof of future financial responsibility,10 neither statute protected the victim of
the uninsured driver's first accident" In 1955, the New York Superintendent
of Insurance approved an endorsement, proposed by insurance interests, for
all auto liability policies which afforded benefits to the innocent owner and his
guests up to $20,000 for bodily injuries or death caused by an uninsured vehicle.
It was offered by the companies at no cost initially and thereafter for sums
varying from $2.50 to $4.00 per year. While a great step forward, such an
endorsement, however, afforded no protection to persons who did not own a

car. 2

Dakota. Briefly, the law provides in substance that when a judgment entered against a
financially irresponsible driver remains unsatisfied for a stated period, the license and registration of such person shall be suspended until payment of the judgment and proof of
financial security for the future.
5. The theory is very similar to that of workmen's compensation, in that the common
law rule of liability based on negligence is not applicable. Upon payment of the premium,
the motorist not only becomes insured himself, but insures any person he may injure regardless of fault.
6. Such funds are now in effect in New Jersey and North Dakota. Generally, funds of
this kind are financed by additional taxes on resident motorists or by assesing the insurance
companies doing business within the state.
7. Prior to the present Art. 6-A, such a plan had been adopted in only one jurisdiction,
Massachusetts. See Mass. Ann. Laws c. 90, § 34A-34J (1933); c. 175, § 113A-113G (194S).

S. In general, see note 4 supra. The New York act also provided for the revocation of
license and registration upon conviction of certain crimes (drunken driving, hit-and-run, etc.).
Proof of financial security had to be furnished thereafter before license and registration would
be reissued. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 695. In the same year, the legislature parced § 59 of
of the Vehicle & Traffic Law, imposing liability on a car owner, for any damages caused by
one operating the vehicle with the permission, e-xpressed or implied, of the owner. This
statute provided the innocent victim with a defendant more likely to respond in damages.
9. See notes 2, 3 supra.
10. Note, that under the 1929 act, future proof was required only after a judgment had
been rendered against the motorist. Under the 1941 statute, future proof is required of the
uninsured motorist by being involved in an accident, regardless of fault. AIso, under the old
law, the requirement of proof lapsed after three years. Under the Safety Responsibility Act,
proof must be maintained as long as the motorist desires to drive a car.
11. In 1951, protection was afforded against the uninsured minor's first accident. Minors
were required to furnish proof of auto liability insurance ($10/20000 and $5,O) before
registration could be issued to them. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 11-A (added by N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1951, c. 296). This requirement is now repealed by the present statute. N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1956, c. 655, § 4.

12. For complete discussion, see Holz, The Indemnification of Victims of the Uninsured
Motorist 29-41 (Aug. 1S, 1955).
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The present Financial Security Act is the only survivor of several attempts
made during the 1956 legislative session to protect the public against financially
irresponsible motorists. In February of 1956, the Superintendent of Insurance
introduced a bill, 13 strongly supported by the Governor,14 calling for the creation of a compulsory indemnification fund. This fund would have been financed
by an assessment of thirty dollars above the cost of registration on every New
York car owner unable to submit proof of his financial security when applying
for a registration certificate. In effect, payment of the assessment would only
give such an owner the privilege of driving his car, and would not relieve him
from personal liability, as he would be primarily liable to reimburse the state
fund. In addition, his driver's license and registration could be revoked and
his auto impounded until any judgment resulting from the use of his vehicle was
satisfied. He would be excluded from the benefits of the fund if he himself were
involved in an accident with an uninsured vehicle. The fund would also have
provided a means of indemnification for losses caused by drivers of stolen cars,
cars registered in other states, and hit-and-run drivers. This compulsory
indemnification law, though passed in the assembly, was tabled in the senate.
Thereafter, a compromise bill, 16 proposed by the legislators preferring the
defeated indemnification approach, was fashioned after the New Jersey Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Law,' 6 and provided for the setting up of a fund
financed by a thirty dollar fee on uninsured motorists the first year and a tax
on insurers of one-half of 1% of net premiums. This bill, however, while
passed in the senate, was defeated in the assembly. As a result, only the
presently enacted compulsory bill went to the Governor for approval. 17
Under the present statute,' 8 no vehicle may be registered in New York,
unless the application is accompanied by proof of financial responsibility, as
evidenced by either a policy of liability insurance, a financial security bond,
a financial security deposit ($25,000), or qualification as a self insurer as
defined by the act.' 9 The average owner will doubtless submit a certificate of
insurance-a liability policy of $20,000 personal liability and $5,000 property
damage.20 After 1957, the statutory requirement for renewal will be met by a
certification by the owner that he has insurance.21 Since the insurance policy
need not be for a period coterminous with registration, 22 the act expressly
13. S. Int. 1579 (1956) ; A. Int. 2105 (1956).
14. Governor's Jan. 1956 Message, 1956 McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1530.
15. S.Int. 3414 (1956); A. Int. 3924 (1956).
16. See note 6 supra. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6-61 (1940).
17. Approved with reservations by the Governor. Governor's April 1956 Message, 1956
McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1675.
18. Effective Feb. 1, 1957, as to penalties. As to registration provisions, effective Oct. 1,
1956, due to fact that in New York, 1957 license plates may be obtained in the fall of 1956.
19. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 93-b(1).
20. Id. § 93-a(4) (a). The policy would not have to be an absolute policy, as required by
the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act for future security, and thus the insurers would
have available to them the usual defenses under the policy.
21. Id. § 93-b(1).
22. Id. § 93-a(4)(a).
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provides that proof of financial responsibility be maintained continuously
throughout the registration period. 23 However, no policy is deemed terminated
by cancellation or failure to renew, until ten days after the mailing by the
insurance company to the insured of the notice of termination, the effective
date of termination being considered the date stated in the notice. Al such
notices must contain a statement in twelve point type to the effect that proof
of financial security must be maintained and that failure to do so would constitute a misdemeanor..2 4 If and when the policy is terminated, the owner has not
only the negative duty of not operating his car, but also the positive duty of
immediately surrendering his plates and registration.2 To effect this surrender
and to put the Commissioner of Insurance on notice that a motorist's insurance
has been terminated, the insurance company has the duty of filing with the
notice of termination within thirty days of the effective date
commissioner the
26
of such notice.
Protection during this thirty-day period, characterized as the "danger
period," 27 is afforded purely by way of rigid sanctions. The resident owner
who operates or permits his auto, which is not covered by liability insurance,
to be operated either within or without the state will find his New York driver's
license suspended and the vehicle's registration revoked for one year. In addition, a registration for any such vehicle will not be issued to him during the
year,28 and the owner will be guilty of misdemeanor.- The New York nonowner who drives such a vehicle within the state with knowledge of the lack
of financial security will also have his license revoked for one year[ 2 and will
also be guilty of a misdemeanor. 31 In its sanction provisions, the act extend3
23.

Id. § 93-b(1).

24. Id. § 93-c.
25. Id. § 93-b(1).
26. Id. § 93-c.
27. The period from the expiration of the policy and physical removal of license plate:.
See Governor's Jan. 1956 Messmge, 1956 McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1530.
28. N.Y. Vehicle &Traffic Law § 93-h(2).
29. Two misdemeanors are a definite possibility: (1) operation of a motor vehicle within
the state for which there is no financial security before or after notice of revocation and/or
license by the Commissioner-§ 93-i; (2) failure to turn in license plates, registration and

driver's license after notice of revocation by the Commissioner-§ 93-h(7). A third misdemeanor is inferred by comparing § 93-b(1), to the effect that upon termination of the
insurance policy (by the mailed notice from the insurer), the owner must surrender license
plates and registration immediately, with § 93-c, which requires that the notice of termina-

tion from the insurer must contain in large type the statement that failure to maintain proof
of financial security throughout the registration period would constitute a midemeanor.
Hence, under this interpretation, resident owner who operated an automobile after notice of
revocation by the Commissioner (not to be confused with a notice of termination) would be
guilty of three misdemeanors.

30. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 93-h(3). Note that the penalty provisions of the act
apply to the resident operator only when driving within the state; to the resident owner,
whether within or without the state-§ 93-h(2).
31. Id. § 93-i. While both resident owner and operator are guilty of a mnsdemeanor if
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not only to resident motorists, but also to owners and operators of vehicles used
in the state, though registered elsewhere. Thus, the owner of a vehicle, not
registered in New York, who operates or permits this auto to be operated in
New York without having financial security, will lose driving privileges within
the state as to that vehicle and any other vehicle owned by him, and will not
32
be permitted to operate any vehicle in New York for a period of one year.
The non-resident operator will forfeit the right to drive any vehicle in the state
for a like period. 33
If involved in an accident, while uninsured, the resident-owner is also subject
to the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Pursuant to this law, the
violator must post security to cover the estimated damages, whether or not the
fault was his, and in addition must furnish proof of financial responsibility in
the future. Prior to the present bill, if both requirements were met within a
sixty-day period following the report of the accident, the motorist could retain
his driving privileges. Under the new act, the motorist automatically forfeits
his registration and license for at least one year and, further, is guilty of a
misdemeanor. The above is true whether the accident occurs before or after
revocation of registration by the Commissioner.34
This New York act is basically similar to the Massachusetts statute which
up to the present time was the only compulsory insurance law in effect. However, it offers certain advantages in that it applies to resident and non-resident
motorists utilizing the state's highways, while the Massachusetts bill is operative only as to state registered vehicles and out-of-state vehicles operated in
Massachusetts for more than thirty days in any one year. New York requires
security for both property damage to the extent of $5,000 and bodily injury
they operate an automobile within the state, obviously the state cannot extend its sovereignty
to deem their out-of-state operation a crime. Note, also, that the penalty and criminal provisions of the statute affect the resident operator only when he drives with knowledge of
lack of financial security. It would appear the owner would incur both penalty and criminal
provisions whether or not he had such knowledge, i.e., whether or not he actually received the
notice of termination. This could occur due to a change of address (and failure to notify Insurer), error of Post Office, or error of insurer in mailing. In the latter situation, equity
would demand that insurer would be estopped from asserting termination of policy, and
hence owner would not be subject to sanctions since still insured.
32. Id. § 93-h(4).
33. Id. 93-h(5). These penalties, relating to operators (resident or non-resident) other
than the owner do not apply to those drivers who had an operator's policy of liability Insurance in effect with respect to the operation of such vehicle. § 93-h(3) (c), § 93-h(S) (c).
34. The revocation section (93-h) provides that the Commissioner shall revoke the registration of such vehicle upon receipt of evidence, such evidence usually constituting the notice
from the insurer within thirty days after the effective date of termination of the policy.
Thus, driving while uninsured does not ipso facto revoke the registration and/or license.
Section 93-h(9) provides that resident or non-resident, involved in an accidentp after registration or license, or both have been revoked, shall lose driving privileges for one year and
until the Commissioner has evidence either that (a) no action has been commenced within a
year from the date of the accident, or that a release has been given or (b) that no judgment
arising out of the accident remains unsatisfied. Thus, the period of revocation may be extended indefinitely.
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up to a limit of $20,000 and the policy must also include guests, while Massa-

chusetts provisions extend only to bodily injury up to $10,000 with guest
coverage not required.a3 The expenses of the administration of the New York
law are now paid by the insurers on a pro rata basis,C while in Massachusetts,
they are paid out of general revenue funds. In Massachusetts, since the insurance rates are made by the Insurance Commissioner, the question of rates
throughout the years has often become a political issue. To avoid this, the
New York bill specifically states that it should not be construed to affect any
change in the application
of the insurance laws whereby rate-making is per37
formed by the insurers.
As to disadvantages of the New York act: while all Massachusetts policies
are coterminous with registration, this is not the case in New York. As a
result of this, and since there is no provision in the New York bill, as is found
in the Massachusetts law, requiring that cancellation or failure to renew be
reviewed by a board of appeals, there arises under the New York law a danger
period, from the date of expiration of the policy till the physical removal of
plates by the police. Also, for renewal of registration in New York, the owner
need not present a new certificate of insurance, as is required by the Massachusetts bill, but only a personal certificate to the effect that he is insured.
The Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act is unquestionably an advance in
assuring the financial security of persons injured by New York drivers, but
the protection is by no means comprehensive. Innocent victims of either the
uninsured resident driving during the "danger period," or of hit-and-run drivers,
unauthorized drivers, or out-of-state and stolen vehicles, are still without a
source of compensation. It would appear also that the coverage afforded by the
act will be even less complete in 1958-when the requirement for registration is
merely a personal certificate of financial security. To the cynically minded,
such a loose requirement amounts to an open invitation to perjury for the hardpressed motorist to whom, in this day and age, the auto has become an integral
part of living, and without which he would find his pleasure and occupation
severely restricted.
The bill introduced by the Superintendent of Insurance, the Compulsory
Indemnification Law, would, to a great extent, have solved these problems.
The present act, supplemented by an unsatisfied judgment fund, would also help
correct the deficiencies discussed. Such an amendment to the compulsory bill,
creating an indemnification fund financed by an additional charge of one dollar
on every New York motorist registering a motor vehicle, did pass the assembly,
but was defeated in the senate. 38 In approving the present act, the Governor
35. However, failure to satisfy a judgment for property damages for a period of sixty
days is cause for suspension of registration till a maximum of $1,00 has been paid. Mass.
Ann. Laws c. 9, § 22A (1933).
36. This constitutes an additional financial burden on the insurer on whom the cost of
administering the present Article 6-B also falls. In time, the costs will be borne by the
motorists, due to incorporation in the rate structure.
37. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 93(2).

38. A. Int. 3943 (1956).
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expressly stated that he would press for such remedial legislation.D Until this
gap in the law is filled, the legislation cannot effectively accomplish its avoweri
purpose.
39. Governor's April 1956 Message, 1956 McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1675. Compromise
legislation was introduced at the 1957 Session, providing for the establishment of an Indemnity fund. This fund would be under the direct management of all private insurance
companies issuing automobile liability insurance in New York State and would be operated
on a non-profit basis. Its function would be to protect insured motorists from losses arising
due to accidents involving illegally operated vehicles, out-of-state uninsured cars, and hit-andrun vehicles. This measure was unanimously passed by the Assembly on March 25, 1957
and sent to the Senate for approval. The Governor's signiture is expected. N.Y. Times,
March 26, 1957 § 1, p. 28.

